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Abstract
Ferrater Mora maintained that «an enemy of animals is another way of being an enemy of
human beings», and similarly many famous thinkers from Aquinas to Kant have held that
cruelty to animals leads to cruelty to humans. But how precisely are we to understand this
connection? This paper reviews the work of Brian Klug, Thomas I. White, Jonathan
Edwards, and James Gustafson, and suggests that cruelty to animals should be rightly cha-
racterised as a «degradation» arising from multidimensional deficiency: (i) a failure of per-
ception, resulting in (ii) an enfeebled intellect, and (iii) a contracted, shrivelled sensitivity.
If true, animal abuse should be taken with greater seriousness by moralists, if only because
there is an ineradicable human interest in curbing our degradation of animals. Indeed,
there is now mounting medical, psychological, and statistical evidence of the link between
animal cruelty and human anti-social behaviour.
Key words: animal ethics, animal experimentation, animal rights, blood fiestas, cruelty,
desensitisation, empathy, hunting, perception, sinfulness, sensitivity, species, the fall.
Resum. «Enemics dels éssers humans»: Josep Ferrater Mora sobre les festes cruels
Ferrater Mora afirmava que ser «un enemic dels animals és una altra manera de ser un ene-
mic dels éssers humans», així com molts pensadors il·lustres des de Tomàs d’Aquino fins a
Kant han sostingut que la crueltat envers els animals condueix a la crueltat envers els
humans. Però, com hem d’entendre exactament aquesta connexió? Aquest article examina
l’obra de Brian Klug, Thomas I. White, Jonathan Edwards i James Gustafson, i suggereix
que la crueltat envers els animals s’hauria de caracteritzar pròpiament com una «degrada-
ció» que emergeix d’una deficiència multidimensional: (i) un error de percepció, que pro-
dueix (ii) un intel·lecte feble, i (iii) una sensibilitat reduïda i esmorteïda. Si això fos cert, el
maltractament dels animals hauria de ser considerat amb molta serietat pels moralistes,
encara que només fos perquè hi ha un interès humà irrenunciable a posar fi a la nostra
degradació dels animals. De fet, hi ha actualment una enorme evidència mèdica, psicolò-
gica i estadística del vincle entre la crueltat cap als animals i un comportament humà anti-
social.
Paraules clau: ètica dels animals, experimentació amb animals, drets dels animals, festes
cruels, crueltat, desensibilització, empatia, caça, percepció, maldat, sensibilitat, espècies,
la caiguda.
Enrahonar 44, 2010 23-34
«Enemies of human beings»: Josep Ferrater Mora
on blood fiestas
Andrew Linzey
The Ferrater Mora Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics
University of Oxford
andrewlinzey@aol.co
IIn an essay entitled Pockets of Cruelty1 on the so-called fiestas that take place
in some Spanish villages, Josep Ferrater Mora starts off by telling his readers
that he was in Spain in August of 1990 because he was participating in a Sum-
mer School course given by the Complutense University of Madrid. He relates
how one morning when he was reading the newspapers, two articles caught
his attention: one was entitled Barbaric Fiesta and was written by Manuel
Leguineche and the other was entitled Spain, the worst enemy of animals by
Carmen del Caño. He believed, he said, that the articles were fictitious and
expresses his admiration and astonishment that these authors could have ima-
gined such cruel and fantastic scenes.
Ferrater Mora then tell us that he was mistaken in supposing that these
two journalists were displaying their creative and imaginative abilities for he
had seen a video taken of some of the so-called «blood fiestas» that the authors
describe. One fiesta involved shows how a crowd of people drag a goat up to
the high bell tower of a church and then push her off so that she lands wounded
and dying on the ground. Ferrater Mora describes the people acting «with an
abandon of a real Bacchanalia», entertaining themselves «in the tortuous death
of the pitiful creature»2.
A second fiesta involved a bull who has a flaming substance attached to
his horns so that the animal «runs from one place to another, terrified, franti-
cally trying to rid itself of these hellish flames which crackle on both sides of
his head». The participants in this gruesome event slap and hit the animal
amidst shouts «of the approving crowd»3.
The people seen in the video act as if the animals involved in these cruel
events were nothing more than an animal in a Walt Disney cartoon that could
be squashed, trampled or run over so that nothing more remains than a flat
substance that can later push and pull itself back into its original shape and
marvelously return to life. But it is impossible to think that they really believed
that for there would be no fun, no excitement in throwing a cardboard goat
from a church tower, no excitement in watching a non-sentient entity crash
to the ground. Terrible to say, but it seems that these people were aroused to
a fever pitch of excitement because they wanted to participate in the suffering
of a creature, precisely one that could experience pain and terror, and they
wanted to watch the slowly dying animal.
Do such activities produce a surge of adrenalin and a feeling of excitement
and pleasure? Max Lerner, an American sociologist, balefully suggests that
«Every people, no matter how civilized, must have the chance to yell for blood»4.
1. FERRATER MORA, Josep (1994). «Bolsas de crueldad» («Pockets of Cruelty») [1990]. Mari-
posas y supercuerdas: Diccionario para nuestro tiempo [hereafter FERRATER MORA. «Pockets»].
Barcelona: Península, p. 139-140, published posthumously, trans. by P. Cohn.
2. FERRATER MORA. «Pockets», p. 139.
3. FERRATER MORA. «Pockets», p. 139.
4. LERNER, Max (1957). America as a Civilization. New York: Simon & Shuster, p. 812.
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Does this explain, for example, so-called «buck fever» experienced by some
hunters when, gun in hand, they see a deer and are filled with excitement,
with heart pounding and often a shaking hand? And are not these examples
of pathology? What Ferrater Mora describes as «degradation»?
Near the end of Ferrater Mora’s article he says that he was made aware of
the suffering of animals by another, but that he himself realizes that «an enemy
of animals is another way of being an enemy of human beings»5. He does not
bother to explain this comment. Did he suppose that his meaning was so clear
that he need not say more?
To be classified as an «enemy» is one of the most pejorative of all human
descriptions. An enemy is by definition a hostile person, a member of an oppo-
sing party or camp. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Ferrater Mora did
not appreciate the historical resonance that this expression would have in a
country that itself had suffered civil war and had, for many long years, expe-
rienced dictatorship. And what —in that context— is the distinguishing mark
of an enemy? Perhaps this most of all: that they betray their own side. Thus
to be an enemy of the people is a way of designating someone as a traitor to the
cause they should represent.
But how is it precisely that cruelty to animals betrays human beings or,
more precisely, their very humanity?
II
Ferrater Mora may have had in mind the great thinkers of the past who have
variously linked abuse of animals to human violence. For instance, St Thomas
Aquinas echoes the theme that cruelty to animals may lead to cruelty to humans.
He writes:
Indeed, if any statements are found in Sacred Scripture prohibiting the com-
mission of an act of cruelty against brute animals, for instance, that one should
not kill a bird accompanied by her young (Deut., XXII, 6), this is said [...] to turn
the mind of man away from cruelty which might be used on other men, lest
a person through practicing cruelty on brutes might go on to do the same to
men6...
St. Thomas More writes that the Utopians
[....] think this enjoyment in beholding deaths, even in beasts, comes from an
inherently cruel disposition or from the habitual practice of cruelty in so bru-
tal a pleasure7.
Montaigne in his essay Of Cruelty declares that
5. FERRATER MORA. «Pockets», p. 141.
6. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 2, 112:13.
7. MORE, St. Thomas (1949). Utopia. Book II, trans. and edited by H. V. S. OGDEN. New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, p. 51.
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Natures that are bloodthirsty toward animals give proof of a natural propen-
sity toward cruelty. At Rome, after they became accustomed to the spectacle of
the slaughter of animals, they proceeded to that of men and of gladiators8.
Locke also echoes the very same idea:
the custom of tormenting and killing of beasts will, by degrees, harden their
minds even towards men; and they who delight in the suffering and destruc-
tion of inferior creatures, will not be apt to be very compassionate or benign
to those of their own kind. Our practice takes notice of this, in the exclusion
of butchers from juries of life and death9.
Kant says much the same thing in his Lectures on Ethics. Kant claims that
«[....] we have duties towards the animals because thus we cultivate the cor-
responding duties towards human beings», asseting that «Tender feelings
towards dumb animals develop humane feelings towards mankind». He gives
as an example a man who shoots his dog because the dog is too old to serve.
Such an act, says Kant,
is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show
towards mankind. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice
kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also
in his dealings with men10.
Kant emphasizes his point by discussing Hogarth’s engravings entitled The
Stages of Cruelty (1751):
He [Hogarth] shows how cruelty grows and develops. He shows the child’s
cruelty to animals, pinching the tail of a dog or a cat; he then depicts the grown
man in his cart running over a child, and lastly the culmination of cruelty in
murder. He thus brings home to us in a terrible fashion the rewards of cruelty
[...] [Kant continues that,] In England butchers and doctors do not sit on a
jury because they are accustomed to the sight of death and hardened11.
Although both Kant and Locke use as proof of their ideas that butchers
were not allowed to sit on juries in England, the notion that cruelty to ani-
mals leads to cruelty to humans is an intuition shared by these thinkers, but it
is not an established fact.
8. MONTAIGNE, Michel de (1960). «Of Cruelty» [1578-1580]. The Complete Essays of Mon-
taigne, II, trans. by Donald M. FRAME. New York: Garden City, p. 109.
9. LOCKE, John (1801). «Cruelty». «Some Thoughts Concerning Education» [1693]. In: Works
of John Locke in Ten Volumes, 10th ed. London, p. 112; extract in LINZEY, Andrew and
CLARKE, Paul A. B. (eds.) (2004). Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology. New York: Colum-
bia University Press, p. 119.
10. KANT, Immanuel (1963). «Duties towards animals and spirits» [Lectures on Ethics, 1775-
1780], trans. Louis INFIELD. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company,
p. 240.
11. KANT. «Duties towards animals and spirits», p. 240f.
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III
That human beings are somehow diminished by inflicting cruelty upon animals;
even to the extent of putting themselves (and other humans) at risk is thus
often assumed. But, if true, how does this happen precisely?
The first issue I want to call attention to concerns perception, or rather
our lack of it. In a little known essay by Brian Klug entitled: «Can we see a
moral question about animals?»12 he uses Thoreau’s notion of «the intention
of the eye», to call attention to how some scientists fails to see a moral issue
in animal experimentation. He writes of how there is «a certain kind of tunnel
vision [in science] which subverts the question altogether, preventing it from
being seen for what it is: a moral question about animals»13. He gives the exam-
ple of Doctor Moreau in H. G. Wells’ famous novel, whose research involves
turning animals into humanoid creatures. The Doctor explains his life’s work,
thus:
You cannot imagine the strange colourless delight of these intellectual desires.
The thing before you is no longer an animal, a fellow-creature, but a pro-
blem. Sympathetic pain —all I know of it I remember as a thing I used to suf-
fer from years ago. I wanted —it was the only thing I wanted— to find out
the extreme plasticity in a living shape14.
Klug takes up the notion that «sympathetic pain» is something one suffers
from —like a weakness or an affliction. Moreau appears to believe that as an
«investigator» ordinary human emotions should not apply to him. He is not
concerned with these things —or rather he is above them. Moreau speaks of
«remorselessness» —a state beyond feeling. But Klug argues that there is always
«logical space for the moral question», which does not simply involve follow-
ing expert opinion. «Experts are never merely experts; they are, in the first
place human beings», says Klug. «Calling a question moral is to call atten-
tion to this fact: to the fact that we are human beings first, whatever the par-
ticular angle of our professional interest»15.
The implication in Klug’s article is not only that we fail to see a moral
question about animals when we treat them as laboratory tools, but also that
we have lost something of ourselves —our very humanity— in doing so. By
failing to perceive correctly what is before us, we impoverish both the object
(or subject) seen, and also ourselves. We might say that the lens through which
12. KLUG, Brian (1998). «Can we see a moral question about animals?». In: LINZEY, Andrew and
YAMAMOTO, Dorothy (eds.) (1998). Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for
Theology and Ethics [Hereafter: KLUG. «Can we see»]. London: SCM Press; Chicago: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, p. 206-215.
13. KLUG. «Can we see», p. 206; original emphases. The work from H. D. THOREAU (1975) is
«Autumnal Tints». The Selected Works of Thoreau, edited by W. HARDING. Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin, p. 709.
14. WELLS, H. G. (1993). The Island of Doctor Moreau [hereafter: WELLS. Moreau]. London:
Everyman, 1993, p. 73; KLUG. «Can we see», p. 207.
15. KLUG. «Can we see», p. 212.
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we see animals diminishes both the viewer and the viewed. The result is illus-
trated in Moreau’s revealing line that: «The thing before you is no longer an
animal, a fellow-creature, but a problem»16. What could have been a fellow-
creature with whom we have a respectful, even convivial relationship, is turned
into a «thing».
Now, if this analysis is correct, it follows that those whose sight is so affec-
ted that they regard other sentient beings as «things», suffer from a kind of
diminishment that warps ordinary human sensitivity. It isn’t that they are «bad»
people as such, but it is true that they are impaired. And what is true of the
scientific investigator must also be true of those involved in blood fiestas. The
goat or bull is not perceived as a «fellow-creature» but a «thing», and hence
can be used and abused. We might say that the participants’ moral sight has
been dimmed and their emotional responses are subsequently disordered. For
that reason alone, the enemies of animals can be said to be the enemies of
human beings.
All this, incidentally, chimes in with what is a common reaction to images or
photographs of animal cruelty. «I can’t bear to see these things» many say. «They
are just too upsetting» add others. It is not difficult to understand these reactions.
Pictures of cruelty to animals are indeed harrowing and quite appropriately engen-
der an emotional response. But there is also a less positive interpretation, and one
that might apply in at least some cases, and which may go to the heart of the mat-
ter. It is that we would rather not see at all —that the act of seeing fully and pro-
perly— is simply too upsetting in that it requires us to give space to that moral
question of which Klug spoke, and thus enlarge our moral universe.
IV
In order to illuminate the matter further, I want to draw, secondly, on an arti-
cle by Thomas I. White entitled: «Dolphin drive hunts and the Socratic dic-
tum: ‘vice harms the doer’»17. White’s article is a critique of hunting dolphins
but, unlike most critiques, centres on how such hunting harms the human
beings involved. He utilises Socrates’ dialogue found in the Gorgias and speci-
fically the dialogue between Socrates and Callicles18. Callicles is an intelligent
young Athenian who is ambitious but ruthless. Socrates says that he is a slave
to his desires: «the two current loves of his life —one a beautiful young man,
the other, the Athenian public» and that Callicles will say anything to please
them19. Socrates’ indictment runs as follows:
16. WELLS. Moreau, p. 73; KLUG. «Can we see», p. 207.
17. WHITE, Thomas I. (2009). «Dolphin drive hunts and the Socratic dictum: “Vice harms
the doer”» [hereafter: WHITE. «Vice harms the doer»]. In: LINZEY, A. (ed.) (2009). The
Link Between Animal Abuse and Human Violence, Brighton (UK) and Portland (USA): Sus-
sex Academic Press, p. 329-340
18. PLATO. Gorgias, trans. by W. C. HELMBOLD (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962);
WHITE. «Vice harms the doer», p. 331 and 340.
19. WHITE. «Vice harms the doer».
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Now I have noticed that in each instance, whatever your favourite says, how-
ever his opinions may go, for all your cleverness you are unable to contradict
him, but constantly shift back and forth at his whim. If you are making a
speech in the Assembly and the Athenian public disagrees, you change and
say what it desires; and in the presence of the beautiful son of Pyrilampes your
experience is precisely similar. You are unable to resist the plans or the assertions
of your favourite; and the result of this is that if anyone were to express surprise
at what you say on various occasions under the influence of your loves, you
would tell him, if you wanted to speak true, that unless your favourites can
be prevented from speaking as they do, neither can you20.
In other words, Callicles is so driven by his desires (to secure the appro-
bation of the one he loves or to gain popularity) that he has an enfeebled intel-
lect as a result: his words are «now aligned with his search for pleasure and not
with his reason and search for truth»21. Desire has hampered the development
of a truly independent mind.
White finds further confirmation of this contention in two directions. The
first is St Augustine’s view that vice leads to ignorance and further incapacity
to do good. It is a kind of self-inflicted punishment that «the man who does not
act rightly although he knows what he ought to do, [henceforth] loses the
power to know what is right; and whoever is unwilling to do right when he
can, loses the power to do it when he wills to»22. According to Socrates and
Augustine, wrongdoing weakens the intellect and helps destroy moral resolve.
The second is found in the work of psychologist Abraham Maslow. White
cites Maslow’s work on psychological health which linked «self-actualisation»
to a strong moral sense:
at least in the group that I studied they [self-actualised individuals] tended to
agree about what was right and wrong, as if they were perceiving something real
and extrahuman rather than comparing tastes that might be relative to the
individual person23.
Thus it seems that, in this case at least, «agreement on values proceed[ed]
from their superior ability to perceive reality»24. Maslow provides this example:
This is very much like the situation with a surgeon or dentist. The surgeon
opening up the abdomen and finding an inflamed appendix knows that it had
better be cut out because if it bursts it will kill the person. This is an example
of truth dictating what must be done, of the is dictating the ought25.
20. PLATO. Gorgias, p. 49-50, 481d-482a; WHITE. «Vice harms the doer».
21. WHITE. «Vice harms the doer», p. 332.
22. St. AUGUSTINE (1964). On Free Choice of the Will, trans. by Anna S. BENJAMIN and L. H.
HACKSTAFF. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, p. 128; WHITE. «Vice harms the doer», p. 333.
23. MASLOW, A. H. (1971). The Farther Reaches of Human Nature [hereafter: MASLOW. Farther
Reaches]. New York: Penguin Books, p. 9; WHITE. «Vice harms the doer», p. 334.
24. WHITE. «Vice harms the doer», p. 334.
25. MASLOW. Farther Reaches, p. 117; WHITE. «Vice harms the doer», p. 334; original emphasis.
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Maslow makes the distinction between the «average» person who may be
described as «is-perceptive but ought-blind» and the healthy person as «more
ought-perceptive». Although Maslow does not explicitly say that «vice harms
the doer», White suggests that «his ideas imply that vice is a trait of the emo-
tionally unhealthy, and that such individuals lack the superior cognitive abili-
ties of the self-actualised». Specifically that
One of the traits of the «ought-blind», then, is that looking at the same facts
as the «ought-perceptive» and coming to a faulty conclusion about the ethi-
cal character of the actions in question26.
White maintains that the thesis of vice harming the doer can be most
readily shown in the weak and incoherent arguments presented (in his case)
for the hunting of dolphins. Apart from faulty factual claims, disregard of
scientific evidence and logical fallacies, he finds that defenders of hunting
discount ethical considerations on the grounds that they are «irrelevant» or
«ethnocentric», and dismiss claims of «cruelty» as «wholly subjective»27. It is
of course this rejection of the ethical dimension to our treatment of animals
that so characterises the arguments of those who wish to harm them.
In short, White finds support in Socrates dictum —a position echoed in
Augustine and Maslow— that «the consequence of vice is that a desire for
something grows so strong that satisfying it is more important than perceiving
reality accurately, dealing with uncomfortable truths about a situation and
respecting the canons of logic»28. When it comes to dolphin hunts, ignoring
evidence and argument as hunters do «must surely count as serious harm to
one’s intellect», the sort that Socrates «would predict from unethical actions»29.
V
My third source of illumination comes from theologian James M. Gustafson in his
work Theology and Ethics30. In seeking to provide a metaphor that might best
explain the meaning of the traditional doctrine of sin, Gustafson turns to St.
Augustine and his notion that the «fall» consisted of a «contraction» of the human
spirit. He cites Augustine that «man did not fall away to become nothing; but
being turned towards himself, his being became more contracted than it was when
he clave to Him who supremely is»31. And then Gustafson connects with the
development of this thought in the work of Jonathan Edwards. The piece is so
rich —and so relevant from our perspective— that it needs to be quoted in full:
26. WHITE. «Vice harms the doer», 334; original emphasis.
27. WHITE. «Vice harms the doer», p. 337.
28. WHITE. «Vice harms the doer», p. 337.
29. WHITE. «Vice harms the doer», p. 337.
30. GUSTAFSON, James M. (1981). Theology and Ethics [hereafter: GUSTAFSON. Theology and
Ethics]. Oxford: Blackwell.
31. St. AUGUSTINE. City of God, Book 14, 13, p. 460; GUSTAFSON. Theology and Ethics, p. 304.
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Immediately upon the fall, the mind of man shrank from its primitive great-
ness and expandedness, to an exceeding smallness and contractedness … Before,
his soul was under the government of that noble principle of divine love,
whereby it was enlarged to the comprehension of all his fellow-creatures and
their welfare. And not only so, but it was not confined within such narrow
limits as the bounds of creation, but went forth in the exercise of holy love to
the Creator, and abroad upon the infinite ocean of good, and was, as it were,
swallowed up by it, and became one with it. [With the fall] all this excellent
enlargedness of man’s soul was gone, and thenceforth he himself shrank, as it
were, into a little space, circumscribed and closely shut up within itself, to the
exclusion of all things else. Sin, like a powerful astringent, contracted his soul
to the very small dimensions of selfishness; and God was forsaken, and fellow-
creatures forsaken, and man retired within himself, and became totally gov-
erned by narrow and selfish feelings and principles32.
To appreciate the argument here one does not have to subscribe to the fall
as a historical event. Rather what is significant is the truth of the anthropo-
logical depiction of a species tragically caught up in a web of its own self-cen-
tredness. Although Edwards did not intend (as far as I know) a trans-species
meaning to the words «fellow-creatures», it is surely not invalid to view his
thought in that wider perspective. As Gustafson himself writes: «The metaphor
of contraction can refer not only to individual persons but to particular human
communities, from the intimacy of the family to the breadth of a nation-state;
it can even refer to the species as a whole»33.
Applying this analogy, then, a lack of sensitivity to other creatures can be seen
as itself a mark of human sinfulness —a sign of the alienation of the species from
itself and of the radical incompleteness of humanity. Selfishness works like a «power-
ful astringent» as Edwards characterises it —reducing our capacity for sympathy
beyond ourselves. And if that is true, it also follows that species self-preoccupation
is a telling indication of an essentially wayward humanity alienated from itself.
VI
I now want to pick up that notion of «degradation» to which Ferrater Mora
refers in his depiction of fiestas:
Apparently horrors are diverting and, as one can see in the video [of the bull
with flaming horns], all the more so as the animal nears the end of her, or as
the case may be his, debasement. This must be a fiesta of degradation for the
benefit of I don’t know which vindictive gods. But no, there are no gods here;
only the pure, naked fury of human beings34.
32. EDWARDS, Jonathan (1834). «Charity». In: The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 2 vols. (Worces-
ter, MA: 1834; reprinted Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1974), p. 157-58;
GUSTAFSON. Theology and Ethics, p. 304-5.
33. GUSTAFSON. Theology and Ethics, p. 305.
34. FERRATER MORA. «Pockets», p. 140.
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Who or what is being degraded? Are animals degraded by fiestas?
Obviously so. Their being and nature is treated with contempt, their suffering
is callously disregarded and turned into a public spectacle. But are not humans
also degraded? It seems inescapable that such degradation is one in which
humans also degrade themselves.
The issue is how to meaningfully characterise that degradation. My analy-
sis suggests that there are at least three ways. To «degrade» means by defini-
tion to diminish, reduce, or down play something essential or authentic.
In that precise sense, our degradation may be characterised as consisting in:
(i) a failure of perception, resulting in
(ii) an enfeebled intellect, and
(iii) a contracted, shrivelled sensitivity.
Let me provide an example that I have often used from my own experience
that might illustrate the central issue.
The university where I used to work was situated amid acres of eighteenth-
century parkland. Wildlife abounded. From my study window I observed fami-
lies of wild rabbits. Looking up from my word processor from time to time
I gazed in wonder, awe, astonishment at these beautiful creatures. I sometimes
said half-jokingly, «it is worth coming to the university for the rabbits». Occa-
sionally I invited visitors to observe them. Some paused in conversation and said
something like «Oh yes», as though I had pointed out the dust in my book-
shelves or the colour of my carpet. What they saw was not rabbits. Perhaps
they saw machines on four legs, «pests» that should be controlled, perhaps just
other «things»35.
I trust I am labouring the obvious here. But this capacity for seeing
—meaning being enthralled, awestruck, grasping the value of living beings
outside ourselves is surely something central to living a fully human life. God’s
creation —or if you will, the complexity and interworking of the natural
world— awed me, and should properly awe us all. Difficult though it is to
believe, and terrible to say, it seems likely that, perhaps without realising it,
some people have lost the capacity to perceive the value of other living creatures
and in consequence live impoverished lives. Those who can see living crea-
tures only as «things», and who cannot empathize with their death and suf-
fering, have in fact cheated themselves, cut themselves off from a richness of
experience and a joy in living. Their humanity, intellect, sensitivity and appre-
ciation of the natural world have been so diminished that they are impaired.
Of course none of the foregoing proves such connections, but they do help
us to understand more concretely than before how humans themselves are
harmed when they treat other sentient creatures as «things». My judgement is
35. LINZEY, Andrew (1999). Animal Gospel: Christian Faith as if Animals Mattered. London:
Hodder and Stoughton; Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, p. 40-41.
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that Ferrater Mora was obviously correct; such fiestas —and, by implication,
all acts of cruelty to animals— exhibit a glaring human deficiency. An enemy
of animals, even in the most benign sense —not as one who mistreats animals,
but simply as one who simply does not see them as sentient individuals— is an
enemy to himself, that is, to his own humanity. That deficiency is such that
he is also an enemy to his fellow human beings, and to the wider community.
Certain things follow from this account. The first and most obvious is that
the issue of animals, and how we treat them, deserves a great deal more atten-
tion that it currently receives. While it is true that philosophers have frequently
written about animals and none of them more profusely than during the last
40 years36, it is also the case that animals are still relegated to the margins of
moral enquiry and regarded as a peripheral issue. This situation ought not to
be allowed to continue. Impartial justice requires that the pains of animals are
given much greater weight than they currently receive. Indeed, in terms of
pain, suffering, deprivation and death, what we do to other sentient creatures
constitutes one of the major moral issues of our time.
The second is that, if Ferrater Mora is right, there is an ineradicably human
dimension to our treatment of animals. By that I mean that —apart from the
issue of justice to individual sentients— there is a legitimate human interest
in curbing our degrading treatment of animals. Of course our laws, conventions
and customs frequently belie this fact; we have become so accustomed to mal-
treatment that we seldom credit it with the seriousness it deserves. Those who
are cruel to animals are hardly ever dealt with severely by the courts or regarded
as guilty of anti-human behaviour. What is needed is a much greater public
recognition of why a world in which cruelty to animals goes unchecked is
bound to be a less safe place for human beings. The issue of animal liberation
is also about the liberation of human beings. The theologian Jürgen Molt-
mann rightly grasped this point in relation to the oppression of slaves and
women, but it equally applies to our treatment of animals:
Oppression always has two sides: on the one hand, the master, on the other
the slave; on the one hand the ruling man, on the other the serving woman. But
oppressions of this kind destroy humanity on both sides37.
VII
The statement that an enemy of animals is another way of being an enemy of
human beings may also be prescient. The article in which Ferrater Mora made
this statement was published in 1994, but the last decade has seen a number
of studies published on the link between animal cruelty and human anti-social
36. For an excellent compendium of modern sources, see ARMSTRONG, Susan J. and BOTZLER,
Richard G. (eds.) (2003). The Animal Ethics Reader, 2nd edition. London and New York:
Routledge.
37. MOLTMANN, Jürgen (2007). A Broad Place: An Autobiography, trans. by Margaret KOHL.
London: SCM Press, p. 328.
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behaviour. Psychological, medical and statistical evidence is beginning steadi-
ly accumulate. In fact, the Centre bearing his name —the Ferrater Mora Oxford
Centre for Animal Ethics— hosted a well-attended international conference
on this very topic in 200738. Paper after paper displayed the growing awareness
that animal abuse is often a precursor, even sometimes a predictor, of subse-
quent abuse either to children, women or the aged. Many health care profes-
sionals now believe that viewing cruelty, or being engaged in cruelty to ani-
mals, leads to a stifling of one’s sense of empathy and that, without these
feelings, at least some people are more apt to engage in anti-social behaviour39.
The Centre is the first in the world dedicated to pioneering ethical perspec-
tives on animals through academic research, teaching and publication and
thereby putting animals on the intellectual agenda. In the last century, Ferrater
Mora was one of the first thinkers in Spain to raise the ethical issue of ani-
mals; we shall now ensure that he is not the last.
38. See http://www.oxfordanimalethics.com/index.php?p=conference_programme.
39. See, for example, some of the papers at the 2007 conference: BEETZ, Andrea M. «Empathy
towards humans and animals as an indicator of emotional development»; FLYNN, Clifton P.
«Beauty and the beasts: woman-battering, pet abuse, and human-animal relationships»;
GULLONE, Eleonora. «The link between animal cruelty and human aggression across the
lifespan»; HAWKSWORTH, Dawn and BALEN, Rachel. «Animal cruelty and child welfare: a
health visitor’s perspective», and RISLEY-CURTISS, Christina. «The role of animals in public
child welfare practice», all in LINZEY, Andrew (ed.) (2009). The Link Between Animal Abuse
and Human Violence. Brighton, UK, and Portland, USA: Sussex Academic Press, 2009.
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